any improvements in them until the expiration of another six weeks from the time when such further alterations may be prepared and laid before both Houses of Parliament. To say the least, this is a state of things exceedingly inconvenient, and which appears to have arisen out of an alteration made in the progress of the Law Amendment Bill.

We have heard of many doubts and difficulties, coming from the sages in the Law of Pleading; and much incline to think, that although the declarations and pleas may be abridged, and some expense in that respect saved, the legal objections which will arise both in the shape of demurrers before trial and of variances at the trial, will create indirectly much more delay and costs than the framers of the Rules have anticipated. We have re-perused the evidence adduced before the Common Law Commissioners, on the question of confining the suitors to one count for a distinct cause of action, and one plea for a distinct ground of defence, and find that the number and weight of testimony are against the alteration. We fear that the practical difficulties of preparing a case for trial have not been sufficiently considered. It often happens that the evidence in support of a contract must be sought from adverse witnesses, who will not dis

close the exact state of the evidence they can give until they appear in the witness box; and in case of a variance between the

special action on the case, to recover damages for an injury, the precise cause of which was unknown before the trial, the single count might allege that the injury was occasioned by this cause, or that, or the other, (to any imaginable number,) so as to meet all the possibilities of proof. But our readers will perceive, that, even if such a mode of pleading were tenable, in reference to other existing principles of pleading, it would lead to the greatest inconvenience, and materially prejudice the defendant. A certain class of cases might at all events have been excepted from the operation of the rule, and the existing regulations for striking out unnecessary counts, and subjecting the party inserting them to the costs of counts not established, would be a sufficient safeguard against their unnecessary introduction.

LAW PROMOTIONS.

Frederick Pollock, Esq. K. C., has been appointed Attorney General for the County Palatine of Lancaster, in the place of Mr. Baron Williams.

COUNTY REGISTER OF DEEDS.

This bill has just been brought in, and we shall give an analysis of it in our next Number. For the present, we may state that it comprises all deeds, conveyances,

wills, and other instruments affecting lands; that decrees in equity and private acts are to be considered assurances; and that equitable mortgages may be registered.

The Register Office to be at such market town as may be appointed at the Quarter Sessions, and the Registrar to be elected by the freeholders.

consequence, at best, appears to be, that instead of the strictness and regularity of a Court of Law, much of the discretionary power of an Arbitrator must be exercised by the Judges and taxing officers, in adjusting the claims and interests of the parties; whilst, incident to this novel and objectionable system, there will be unavoidably, in many cases, an increase of expense and delay. We observe that one of the witnesses before the Common Law Commissioners states his opinion, that the different averments which now constitute separate

A memorial of the deed or instrument is to be made; but the originals are not re

register them at full length if they require it, as a security against fire or other accident.

THE NEW SCALE OF COSTS.

Since the article on the reduced Scale of Costs was written (p. 419,) we have received some further communications, and believe that the practitioners in general are not satisfied with the reasons which have been given in favor of the proposed costs in actions not exceeding 201. They hold that some of the items are too paltry to be accepted, and that it will be impossible to

432

Law of Property and Conveyancing. SHARES OF DECEASED DEVISEES. P. 400. The nephew and niece having both died in the life-time of the testator, their presumptive interest under the will thereby lapsed; and on the death of the testator, would form a portion of the residue of his estate, and will consequently belong to the widow. The words "heirs and assigns" can have no effect; the testator may have possibly meant them to denote the nature of the interest his nephew was to take; but the nephew having died in the life-time of the testator, and all interest having thereby gone, his representatives cannot possibly have any claim upon the testator's estate. Doe, d. Turner, v. Kett, 4 T. R. 601, is a much stronger case.

Номо.

CODICIL. REPUBLICATION. P. 287, 335.

The answer to W.'s difficulty will be found in Strathmore v. Bowes, 7 T. R. 483 (3 L. O. 245). If A. devises his house at B. [or all his real estate] to C. in fee; acquires another house, and by codicil confirms his will: in the first case the other house will not pass; in the latter case it will. The confirmation of a will by a codicil, merely makes the will repeat the words contained in it. Α. Ε. Ι.

Practice.

UNIFORMITY OF PROCESS ACT.-BAIL BOND. р. 399.

There can be no actual necessity to obtain a rule to return the writ, before taking an assignment of the bail bond, if you elect to take an assignment in preference to ruling the Sheriff; but as a matter of expediency, I think it better that, so soon as four days after the arrest have expired, agreeably to the indorsement on the writ of capias, a rule to return the writ should be obtained and served; and on the Sheriff's returning the writ, you may then either rule him to bring in the body, or take an assignment of the bail bond, as may be deemed most prudent. GENUS.

QUERIES.

Common Law.

BANKER'S CHEQUE.

A. being indebted to B., gave him a cheque upon his bankers in liquidation of the debt, but which was not presented for payment until the fifth day after it had been given; in the mean while, the bankers stopped payınent, and were subsequently declared bankrupts, but without having any of B.'s effects in their hands at the time of cessation of payment, though they had after the cheque had been given, and at a time when it would have been paid had it been presented, A. in the interim having drawn out his balance. Under these circumstances, can B. sue A. for the amount of the cheque, or has he, by his negligence by non-presentment within due time, discharged A.? If B. has no remedy against A., I consider the debt as lost, taking it to be clear that B. can have no claim upon the estate of the bankers. L. W. S.

THE EDITOR'S LETTER BOX.

We thank H. J. H. for his book, which we shall read with interest; but whether it can be noticed in our pages, consistently with their strictly legal character, we cannot yet determine.

We are requested to invite the communication of a List of the various Acts now in force establishing Courts of Request. Mr. Tidd Pratt's Book, published in 1824, furnishes the information down to that period, and we shall be glad to know, for the use of the profession, what alterations have taken place since that time.

J. H. will see that we have attended to the subject to which he alludes.

The letter of H. W. G. is acceptable, and we shall avail ourselves of it next week.

The letters of T. S.; J. C.; and F. W., are under consideration.

A correspondent in Barnard's Inn is informed, that the decision, as reported at p. 388, certainly took place; and the only mistake, if any, is in the name of the case, which may have been inaccurately heard.

We have received the names of some of the

Perpetual Commissioners residing in the country, and will include, in our Supplement of the 29th instant, all the names that are sent on

or before the 26th.

"Legalis" is informed that he may procure at our publisher's the Numbers he requires to complete the Sixth or any other Volume.

The Queries and Answers of W. H. S.; E. G.; G. E.; "Homo;" T. C.; C.; and A. Z., have been received.

We looked forward with great interest to the Report of the Common Law Commissioners on the subject of the Inns of Court. We have from time to time devoted a considerable portion of our space to the consideration of their present state, and the propriety of altering the mode of legal education now pursued in them. We were glad, therefore, to find the Lord Chancellor, on behalf of his brother benchers, declare their willingness that the subject should be investigated in the fullest manner; that they courted investigation, and were ready to submit their revenues, their privileges, and the existing modes of governing the Inns of Court, to the Commissioners, to be dealt with by them as they should see fit. We understand that the following are, in substance, the recommendations contained in the Report.

1. That the Societies be enjoined to allow, and the Judges of the Courts at Westminster to receive, an appeal from any act of the Benchers of any Inn of Court, rejecting an application for admission into their Society. 2. That in all cases where an application is rejected, whether it relates to admission as a Student, or to the call to the Bar, the party applying shall have notice in writing of the cause of rejection-shall be allowed to clear himself from any charge of miscon

a See particularly the articles in our Fourth Volume, "On the Misapplication of the Revenues of the Inns of Court."

NO. CXCVI.

pose shall be at liberty to make his defence, either in person or by counsel, and to produce evidence; and that a full report of the whole evidence, and other proceedings before the Benchers, shall (in the event of an appeal) be laid before the Judges.

3. That no general rules or orders in future to be made by any of the Societies on the subject of Admission of Students, or the Call to the Bar, shall be of any force until they shall have been laid before all the Judges of the Superior Courts at Westminster, to be assembled for that purpose, and approved and subscribed by such Judges, or any eight or more of them.

4. The regulation which relates to practising as Special Pleaders or Conveyancers, and the necessity for attaining for that purpose the permission of the Societies, is considered objectionable, but it does not appear what alteration is recommended.

5. That the certificate of two graduated Members of any of the Universities, or of two respectable householders, should suffice; and that the persons signing the recommendation need not certify that the applicant is personally known to them.

6. That the power of admitting or rejecting an applicant for Call to the Bar, should in future be vested in the Benchers only, to the exclusion of the Bar Table.

It will be seen, that the learned Commissioners have not pursued their inquiries into every branch of the subject. So far as their recommendations go, we are disposed to agree with most of them; but we shall reserve their further consideration until next week. At present, it strikes us, that any alteration with respect to Special Pleaders and Conveyancers is uncalled for.

2 E

ON THE LAW OF LIBEL.

We are glad that a Select Committee has been appointed to consider the state of the present Law of Libel, as we are satisfied that it demands all the attention and investigation which a body of this kind is best qualified to give. We shall now mention the principal points which deserve their consideration, most of which were stated in the able speech of the Solicitor General, on moving for the Committee; and it will be readily admitted by all, that a system more faulty and incongruous than the present can hardly exist.

There can be no doubt, that under the present state of the law, the rule that has been lately enforced, that a newsvender is liable to an action of libel for the bare sale of a newspaper containing libellous matter, is the true one, as the sale amounts to a publication; but the manifest hardship and injustice of this state of the law must, we think, be apparent to all. The remedy proposed for this grievance, which would also apply to some others, is to enact that the simple act of publishing, or assisting in the publication, shall not constitute an offence; but that it should be further necessary that the prosecutor should bring some proof of knowledge of the libel home to the accused; in short, that malice should not, as at present, be implied, but should be proved against the person to be convicted.

Another grievance is undoubtedly the unsettled state of the law as to what constitutes a libel-a point which books have been composed to settle, and which certainly some learned Judges have reduced to absurdity. Lord Erskine used to say of the state of the law in his time respecting the taking a debt out of the Statute of Limitations, that the only way was for the debtor to knock the creditor down if he were asked for payment, and wished that the statute should not be defeated; and certainly the law of libel is in a similar state of absurdity. If all the opinions given from the Bench on the subject were to be taken as law, the most harmless piece of raillery might be punished as libellous matter; and cient number of instances have occurred to render the whole subject ridiculous. Some endeavour should therefore be made to define the nature and limits of a libel in law.

a

suffi

The next point to which the attention of the Committee should be directed is, that

rule of law which declares that truth is a libel. As our readers well know, in criminal proceedings the truth of a libel cannot be taken into consideration at all,a although in civil cases the allegation of truth may be brought forward, and if proved, is conclusive. The observations of the Solicitor General on this point are worthy of attention. "It was," he said, "difficult to go to the extent that every man had a right to publish any thing of any body, provided only it were true. It had been suggested that some such rule as this should be established; that if the publication charged as libellous should be proved to be true, that should be an answer to the implied malice. As the law at present stood, a libel carried with it an implication of malice. It was vain for a defendant to prove the truth of the publication, and that he never entertained a suspicion of its containing libellous matter. If a man maliciously published that which was not true of another person, it was fit that he should be punished for so doing. In many cases it might not be right to publish matter which was true; but it never could be justifiable to publish what was not true. Some such rule as that which he had adverted to might possibly be adopted, and it was a point worthy of inquiry. At present he was inclined to think, that if a jury should find that a defendant has published a libel innocently - that was to say, for a good purpose, or without express malice-the evidence of the truth of the publication should protect him from the implied malice. In proceeding by simple action, the consequences resulting from the present law were really absurd. If the defendant should succeed in proving the libel to be true, no matter how injurious or cruel it might be, or how malicious soever the motives might be which prompted its publication, the person libelled could obtain no redress." It will be seen, therefore, that the present law is altogether defective in

a A very recent instance has occurred of the hardship of this rule, in a case just reported. A libel stated that there was a riot at C., and that a person fired a pistol at an assemblage of persons; and upon this, imputed neglect of duty to the magistrates; and it was held by Patteson, J., on a trial for a criminal information for this libel on the magistrates, that the defendant's counsel, with a view of shewing that the libel did not exceed the bounds of free discussion, could not go into evidence to prove that there was in fact a riot, and that a pistol was in fact fired at the people. Rex v. Brigstock, 6 Car & Pay. 185.