envelopes to show that they are his own, and not his employer's letters. Therefore his notice to the postmaster is clearly too large, because all the let ters which are addressed to him at his place of bus iness do not belong to him." Fry, L. J., said: "1 conceive that the court has plainly jurisdiction to grant injunctions against slander, as well as against libel. At the same time I am not unconscious of the inconvenience which would result from trying actions for slander on motions to commit. I think that requires careful consideration in any case in which the court is asked to grant an injunction against slander. Then with regard to the notice to the postmaster. It seeme to me, for the reasons given by Bowen, L. J., that the notice was too large, and I come to that conclusion from the very simple fact that it has induced the postmaster to send to the defendant letters which belong to the plaintiffs. Then the question as to who is to open letters is undoubtedly one of considerable difficulty, for this reason, that the court is averse from interfering with a legal right except so far as is absolutely necessary, and in the present case the court would not desire to interfere with the legal right in the letters. But that right cannot be ascertained until they are opened; they must be opened by somebody, and therefore the court has to determine who is to open them. There are many reasons which induce me to think that the plaintiffs are the proper persons to open them. In the first place, the letters are addressed to their place of business; and in the next place, there appears to be a presumption prima facie that most of the letters addressed to the defendant coming there are letters which are addressed to the defendant on their business; and lastly, the defendant has certainly behaved, with regard to some of the letters, and with regard to his other relations to his former employers, in a manner which is not creditable to him, and which, as between him and the plaintiffs, renders it more expedient that the opening should be done by them in his presence than by him in their presence." On the latter point, see Myers v. Kalamazoo Buggy Co., 30 Alb. Law JOUR.

ing a good presentment of the necessary tableaux. A good actress, moved by a proper spirit toward her manager, ought to have been ready and willing to do all in her power to contribute to the promotion of that success upon which both so much depend. So far the case has been considered upon the law applicable to contracts of hiring, without regard to the terms of the special contract in this case, which provided, that if upon fair trial, the defendant felt satisfied that the plaintiff was incompetent to perform the duties for which the defendant had contracted, in good faith, the latter might annul the contract on two weeks' notice. This clause made the defendant the sole judge of the competency of the plaintiff. In the case of Nelson v. Von Bonnhorst, 29 Penn. St. 352, it was held that a contract 'to pay whenever in my opinion my circumstances will enable me to do so, imposes no legal obligation which can be enforced by action, although the court and jury should find that the party was of sufficient ability to pay the debt, as by the terms of the contract the debtor is made the sole judge of that fact. Under the contract in this case, the only question for the jury to determine was the good faith of the defendant, and therefore the jury were instructed that if the defendant was satisfied in good faith that the plaintiff was incompetent, the defendant had a right to dismiss the plaintiff, and in that case the verdict should be for the defendant, although the jury were of opinion that the plaintiff was competent to perform her parts. The defendant was not liable for error in her judgment, if in good faith she exercised her judgment and acted upon it. Having the power to give judgment, she is not liable for error if she did not act maliciously, although she may have exercised her power arbitrarily. Doroning v. McFadden, 18 Penn. St. 334. No one is liable for a mistake in the exercise of a discretion conferred upon him. Moore v. School Directors of Clearfield, 59 Penn. St. 232. The defendant testified that she was satisfied that the plaintiff was incompetent, and discharged her for that season, as well as others; and she very properly introduced evidence showing that she has a basis for her judgment as evidence of her good faith, and for the purpose of showing that she did uot set up her judgment as an afterthought and subterfuge to avoid the consequences of her action, and she made so strong a presentment that it is not free from doubt whether the jury ought not to have been directed to render a verdict for the defendant." As to contracts to satisfaction, see Gibson v. Cranage, 39 Mich. 49; S. C., 33 Am. Rep. 351, and note, 353; Wood Reaping and Mowing Machine Co., 50 Mich. 565; S. C., 45 Am. Rep. 57; Werner v. Bergman, 28 Kans. 60; S. C., 42 Am. Rep. 152, note, 153.

INTER-STATE EXTRADITION.

I.

:

which would have resulted from the failure to regulate, by a comprehensive and uniform law binding upon all the States, a matter of such vital importance to the administration of criminal law, incorporated into the Constitution the provisions of section 2 of article 4, "a person charged in any State with treason, felony or other crime who shall flee from justice and be found in another State, shall on demand of the executive authority of the State from which he had fled be delivered up to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the crime." The first and all important question is whether the imperative language of this provision imposes upon the several States a duty, the performance of which may be enforced by any tribunal, State or Federal; or whether the duty is one of imperfect legal obligation. That an absolute duty, involving no discretion whether the case is brought clearly within the language and spirit of this provision, was intended to be devolved upon the several States, cannot be seriously questioned. Indeed all the authorities support this view of the question. Work v. Corrington, 34 Ohio St. 64; S. C., 32 Am. Rep. 345; Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66. This duty however has been held by the United States Supreme Court to be a duty of imperfect legal obligation, for the reason that there is no constituted legal tribunal vested with authority to enforce its performance. For the purpose of the discharge of this duty the States are independent sovereignties with respect to one another, responsible to no superior, and not subject to the coercion of any tribunal. This duty is the same in its nature as those duties which are imposed by the laws of nations upon the different sovereignties of the civilized world in their intercourse one with another. Such duties are of imperfect obligation, because there exists no common tribunal to which nations can appeal for the settlement of their controversies; no court of judicature vested with the authority to determine their conflicting claims, and with the power of carrying its judgment into execution. The case of Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66, settled the doctrine of the exemption of the States and their executives from national or other control in all cases of inter-State extradition. In this case the governor of Kentucky moved the United States Supreme Court for a rule on the governor of Ohio to show cause why a mandamus should not issue commanding him to cause one Willis Lago, a fugitive from justice, to be delivered up to be removed to the State of Kentucky, having jurisdiction of the crime with which he was charged. The motion was overruled, with the concurrence of all the justices in the opinion of the court, delivered by Chief Justice Taney. The decision is summed up in its concluding sentence: "But if the governor of Ohio refuses to discharge this duty, there is no power delegated to the general government, either through the judicial department or any other department, to use any coercive means to compel him." To same effect State

This case also settled another very important ques❘tion, namely, that the demand for the fugitive must be made by an appeal to the executive authority of the State, although the Constitution is entirely silent on that subject. The court say at page 102: "The clause in question, like the clause in the Confederation, authorizes the demand to be made by the executive authority of the State where the crime was committed, but does not in so many words specify the officer of the State upon whom the demand is to be made, and whose duty it is to have the fugitive delivered and removed to the State having jurisdiction of the crime. But under the Confederation it is plain that the demand was to be made on the governor or executive authority of the State, and could be made on no other department or officer, for the Confederation was only a league of separate sovereignties in which each State within its own limits held and exercises all the powers of sovereignty, and the Confederation had no officer, either executive, judicial or ministerial, through whom it could exercise an authority within the limits of a State. In the present Constitution however these powers to a limited extent have been conferred on the general government within the territories of the several States. But the part of the clause in relation to the mode of demanding and surrendering the fugitive is (with the exception of an unimportant word or two) a literal copy of the article of the Confederation, and it is plain that the mode of the demand, and the official authority by and to whom it was addressed under the Confederation, must have been in the minds of the members of the convention when this article was introduced, and that in adopting the same words they manifestly intended to sanction the mode of proceeding practiced under the Confederation - that is of demanding the fugitive from the executive authority, and making it his duty to cause him to be delivered up."

While the governor of a State has in every case the undoubted power to refuse to comply with the requisition and grant the warrrant, yet it is nevertheless his duty to issue his warrant for the apprehension of an alleged fugitive from justice in every case coming within the scope of the Constitution, unless some special reasons exist justifying arefusal. The courts have determined what some of these special reasons are. It is important that they should be referred to, not because they can ever be invoked in the courts to support the claim to immunity from arrest and surrender, but for the reason that it is always in the power of the alleged fugitive to obtain a hearing before the governor of the State in which he has been or is to be arrested, either after or before the issuing of the warrant by such governor. These rules which have been established by the judiciary for the guidance of executive discretion in such cases, though not obligatory upon the executive, will yet undoubtedly be observed and followed in all cases in which they may be properly applied. It therefore becomes necessary to inquire what rules have been established justifying the governor of a State in refusing to grant the warrant in cases where he has undoubtedly the power to issue it. Iu the first place if the alleged fugitive from justice is held for crime in the State to which he has fled, and from which he is demanded, the governor has the right to refuse, and should refuse to issue the warrant. Work v. Corrington, 34 Ohio St. 64; S. C., 32 Am. Rep. 345; Taylor v. Taintor, 16 Wall. 366, 370; Troutman's case, 4 Zabr. 634; In re Briscoe, 51 How. Pr. 422. He may and should refuse to deliver the fugitive when he is satisfied that the sole object of the prosecution and extradition is to enforce collection of a claim. Work v. Corrington, supra. In this case the court say on this point: "The provision was inserted in the articles of Confederation, and subsequently in the Constitution, to subserve public and not private purposes. The object was to secure the punishment of public offenders, and not to enforce the payment of private claims, whether well or ill founded. To employ this extraordinary process for public purposes tends to secure peace and good order, but to prostitute it to the advancement of private ends is to bring it into great disfavor. True, the theory is that the demanding State will hold the offender for trial, even though he be brought into the State fraudulently or forcibly, and without process, but experience shows that where the end sought is private the accused is rarely brought to trial. No satisfactory reason is perceived why a governor should issue or obey a requisition when he is satisfied that the sole object of the party complaining is to enforce the payment of a private claim for money. Such an abuse of process is equivalent to a fraudulent use of it." In such a case a warrant which has been already granted may be revoked. This was the ground on which the warrant in the case of Work v. Corrington, supra, was revoked, and the court approved and sustained the action of the governor in this respect, and expressed its opinion in these most emphatic words: "For reasons equally strong, a governor from whom such warrant is obtained for the advancement of private ends fails to discharge his duty if he neglects to revoke the provision discovering the fraud." The warrant may be revoked even after the fugitive has been apprehended and is in the custody of the agent of the demanding State, provided he is still within the territorial limits of the State upon which the demand was made. This is precisely what was done in the above case, and the action of the governor was approved by the court. Moreover the revocation need not be made by the governor who granted the warrant. It may be made by his successor in office. In the above case the warrant was issued by Governor Hayes, and was revoked by his successor, Governor Young. The reasoning of the court on this point is brief, but convincing and unanswerable: “Further objection is made that Governor Young had no authority to revoke a warrant issued by Governor Hayes. But we have seen that the governor acts in

his official capacity. The warrant is not process of the person holding the office of governor, but a warrant issued by an officer. We all agree that Governor Young had the same power to revoke a warrant issued by his predecessor that he had to revoke one issued by himself." The cases we have been considering are cases in which it has been held to be the moral duty of the executive to revoke a warrant once issued. These rules should therefore be invoked before the governor himself. The fugitive can never avail himself of them upon habeas corpus. If the decision of the executive is against him in cases where the power to grant the warrant exists, the decision is final and subject to no review. But suppose the executive revokes a warrant without any reason for so doing, will it be a good answer to the revocation, on a writ of habeas corpus, that the governor should not have recalled the warrant in the absence of any sufficient reason? In other words, is the power of the executive to revoke the warrant circumscribed or unlimited? On both principle and authority the power to revoke the warrant must be considered to be as broad and unlimited as the power originally to refuse the granting of the warrant. The case of Work v. Corrington, supra, is explicit on this point. The syllabus clearly states the decision so far as this question is concerned: "Where such warrant has been revoked by the governor no inquiry will be made in a proceeding on habeas corpus on behalf of the alleged fugitive as to the grounds of such revocation, although at the time of the revocation the fugitive may have been in the custody of the agent of the demanding State." It is therefore the law that the executive has the power not only arbitrarily to refuse the granting of the warrant, but also arbitrarily to revoke it after it has been properly issued. The moment it is revoked the agent of the demanding State ceases to have any authority to retain the fugitive in his custody, and the court on habeas corpus must discharge him. The decision in this case of Work v. Corrington, that the fugitive must be released on habeas corpus, even though he was in the custody of the agent of the demanding State at the time of the revocation of the warrant is unquestionably sound, for the reason that while the fugitive remains within the territorial limits of the State to which he has fled, he cannot be subjected to the laws or control of the State in which he committed the crime. The agent who has him in his custody derives all his authority to hold him and deprive him of his liberty from the warrant of the governor. The moment that warrant is revoked his authority is annulled, and from that moment his detention of the fugitive is unlawful.

While the conduct of the executive in refusing to issue the warrant is subject to no judicial control, yet his decision in granting the warrant is al ways subject to the supervision of the courts, and unless the case is brought clearly within the scope of the constitutional provision, and the act of Congress passed in pursuance of that provision, the