Competing Principals: Committees, Parties, and the Organization of CongressSince Woodrow Wilson, political scientists have recognized the importance of congressional committees in the policy-making process. Congressional committees often determine what legislation will reach the floor of the House or Senate and what form that legislation will take. In spite of the broad consensus on the importance of congressional committees, there is little agreement on what explains committee action. Committees are alternately viewed as agents of the chamber, the party caucuses, or constituencies outside the institution. Each theory suggests a different distribution of power in the policy-making process. Forrest Maltzman argues that none of these models fully captures the role performed by congressional committees and that committee members attempt to balance the interests of the chamber, the party caucus, and outside constituencies. Over time, and with the changing importance of a committee's agenda to these groups, the responsiveness of members of committees will vary. Maltzman argues that the responsiveness of the committee to these groups is driven by changes in procedure, the strength of the party caucus, and the salience of a committee's agenda. Maltzman tests his theory against historical data. This book will appeal to social scientists interested in the study of Congress and legislative bodies, as well as those interested in studying the impact of institutional structure on the policy-making process. "This specialized study, of value to congressional scholars and partisan activists, enriches an understanding of the increasingly predictable patterns of committee variety." --Choice Forrest Maltzman is Assistant Professor of Political Science, George Washington University. |
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104th Congress 96th Congresses agenda Aligned No bias amendment analysis appointments Appropriations Committee argue assignment process bers bill Budget Caucus-Contingent Relation chamber and party chamber median changes commit committee assignment committee behavior committee contingents committee median committee members committee performance committee system Committee-Chamber Relation committee's conditional model congressional committees Congressional Quarterly constituency committees Cox and McCubbins Democratic caucus differences disagreement score discharge petition Fenno floor full chamber Gingrich House and Senate House committees incentive independent-committees model information asymmetry interests jurisdiction Kiewiet and McCubbins Krehbiel leadership leverage majority party majority-party caucus Majority/Moderate Minority McCubbins 1993 median member mildly contested Minority Dc mittee moral hazard multiple referral Newt Gingrich noncommittee members Oleszek Outlier p-value party caucuses party leaders party strength party-delegation party-dominated model party's percent period postreform principals procedures representative Republican responsive role performed roll call votes Rules Committee salient committees Senate committees Shepsle Smith and Deering Speaker tees tion Weingast