 | England - 1866 - 830 pages
...complete the statement by calling it a scries of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future, and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that...or of accepting the paradox, that something which, ex hypothesi, is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series." —P. 211. It would... | |
 | Literary and Philosophical Society of Liverpool - Humanities - 1897 - 346 pages
...Mill, with his usual candour, states the case thus — " We are reduced (by the phenomena of memory) to the alternative of believing that the Mind or Ego...them, or of accepting the paradox that something which is, ex hypothesi, but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series" * There is always a... | |
 | 1865 - 550 pages
...the statement by calling it a series of feolings which is aware of itself as past and future ; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that...or of accepting the paradox that something which, ex hypothesi, is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series. The truth is that we... | |
 | John Stuart Mill - Knowledge, Theory of - 1865 - 342 pages
...the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future ; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that...or of accepting the paradox, that something which ex hypothesi is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series. The truth is, that we... | |
 | John Stuart Mill - Philosophy - 1865 - 578 pages
...the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future : and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that...or of accepting the paradox, that something which ex hypothesi is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series. The truth is, that we... | |
 | John Stuart Mill - 1865 - 578 pages
...speak of it in terms which assume a theory, to use them with a reservation as to their meaning. ing that the Mind, or Ego, is something different from...or of accepting the paradox, that something which ex /iypothesi is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series. I have stated the difficulties... | |
 | 1865 - 540 pages
...itself as past and future ; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the Mind or JSjo is something different from any series of feelings or possibilities of them, or of accepting th« paradox that something which, ex liypoihesi, w bat a series of feelings, can be aware of itself... | |
 | David Masson - Philosophy - 1865 - 432 pages
...definition of mind as " a series of feelings " must be abandoned, and the mind must be thought of as " something different from any series of feelings or possibilities of them," or the paradox must be maintained that " that which, ex hypothcsi, is " but a series of feelings can be... | |
 | English literature - 1866 - 618 pages
...conclude the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future, and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that...or of accepting the paradox that something which, ex hypothesi, is but a series of feelings can be aware of itself as a series.' Mr. Mill allows this... | |
 | Congregationalism - 1866 - 650 pages
...the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future ; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that...or of accepting the paradox, that something which ex hypothesi is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself. " The truth is, that we arc here... | |
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If, therefore, we speak of the mind as a series of feelings we are obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind, or Ego,... 
