authorized to answer for him (1), or employs an agent to make certain propositions respecting a transaction between. himself and another (2), he is bound by what his agent says, or does, within the scope of his authority, as much as if it had been done, or said, by himself. Thus, for example, in an action for goods sold and delivered, where it appeared at the trial, that, in a conversation between the plaintiff and defendant, the former asserted that he had delivered the goods by one C., and the defendant replied, "If C. will say he did deliver the goods, I will pay for them," the plaintiff was allowed to give in evidence C.'s answer respecting the matter referred to him (3). In the case of Fabrigas v. Mostyn, a point arose, which may serve as another example to illustrate the rule here laid down. A witness, who had been employed by the defendant, to convey certain proposals to the plaintiff, explained them to him by an interpreter, from whom also he received the answer (4): the question was, whether the words of the interpreter could be given in evidence by the witness, as the answer of the plaintiff; or whether the interpreter himself ought to be called, as the witness understood neither the questions put to the plaintiff, nor the answer made by him. But Mr. Justice Gould ruled, that the evidence of the witness was clearly admissible, and sufficient. Here the interpreter was the accredited agent of the parties, acting within the scope of his authority, and in the execution of his agency. It must be remembered, that the cases, in which the declarations of an agent have been admitted against the principal, are exceptions to that general rule, which requires evidence to be given upon oath : and the exception is confined *to such statements as are made by him, either at the time of his making an agreement about which he is em (1) Daniell v. Pitt, 1 Campb. N. P. C. 366. (2) Gainsford v. Grammar, 2 Campb. N. P. C. 9. (3) Daniell v. Pitt, 1 Campb. N.P. C. 366; 6 Esp. N. P. C. 74, S. C. * 78 ployed, or in acting within the scope of his authority. "Except in one or other of these ways, (said the Master of the Rolls, in Fairlie v. Hastings (1),) I do not see how they can be evidence against the principal:" and, therefore, in that case, (where the fact, sought to be established, was, that a bond had been executed by the defendant to the plaintiff, which the defendant had got possession of,) he refused to admit, as evidence of this fact, the declarations of the defendant's agent, who had been employed to keep the bond for the plaintiff's benefit, and who, on its being demanded by the plaintiff, informed him that it had been delivered to the defendant (2). "The admission of an agent, (continued the Master of the Rolls,) cannot be as`similated to the admission of the principal. A party is bound by his own admission, and is not permitted to contradict it. But it is impossible to say, a man is precluded from questioning or contradicting any thing, that any person may have asserted, as to his conduct or agreement, merely because that person has been an agent (a). If any fact, material to the interest of either party, rests in the knowledge of an agent, the general rule is, that it ought to be proved by his testimony, not by his mere assertion." The force and effect of an admission must of course depend upon the circumstances under which it has been made. In many cases, it will be evidence of the strongest kind, if clearly proved: in some, it amounts to little. A full and free admission of a debt is, unless satisfactorily explained, conclusive against the party who makes it. On the other hand, an offer to pay money by way of compromise, and to get rid of an action, is not evidence of a debt (3); in such cases, the point to be considered is, what the view and intention of the party was in making the offer, whether to buy peace, or from a conviction of the (1) 10 Ves. 128. 128; Young v. Wright, 1 Campb. (2) Fairlie v. Hastings, 10 Ves. 139; Wilson v. Turner, 1 Taunt. 398. (3) Bull. N. P. [236.] (a) Vide ante 76. n. (a) justice of *the demand against him. "Thus, if A. sue B. for 1001., and B. offer to pay him 201., it shall not be received in evidence, for this neither admits nor ascertains any debt, and is no more than saying he would give 201. to get rid of the action. But if an account consists of ten articles, and B. admits that a particular one is due, it is good evidence for so much (1)." Admissions of particular articles before an arbitrator are also evidence under the same limitation, that is, when they are made, not with a view to a compromise, but while the parties are contesting their rights (2). Admissions by a party to the suit are evidence, whether made before or after the commencement of the action (a), whether before arrest or after, whether in writing or by parol. The recital of a fact in the counterpart of an indenture is evidence against the party by whom the deed is executed (3). So, answers in chancery are evidence in trials at law against the party that made them (4), and very strong evidence, as they are delivered in upon oath. It is scarcely necessary to observe, that the whole of the answer or admission must be taken together, in order to show distinctly the full meaning and sense of the party (b). Thus, if a person, in making an admission against his own interest, refers to a written paper, without which the admission is not complete, the contents of the paper ought to be shown, before the statement can be used as evidence Bull. N. P. [236.] Bull. N. P. Ib. 1 P. Wms. 497. Slack v. Buchanan, Peake, N. P. C. 5. Waldridge v. Kennison, 1 Esp. N. P. C. 143. (3) Burleigh v. Stibbs, 5 T. R. 465. See infra, as to recitals. (4) Bull. N. P. 237. (a) Vide Morris's Lessee v. Van Deren, 1 Dall. 65. Sluby v. Champlin, 4 Johns. Rep. 461. (b) Vide Carver v. Tracy, 3 Johns. Rep. 427. Fenner v. Lewis, 10 Johns. Rep. 38. Credit v. Brown, Ibid. 365. Hopkins v. Smith, 11 Johns. Rep. 161. Waggoner v. Gray's Administrators, 2 Hen. &. Mun. 603. Newman v. Bradley, 1 Dall. 240. Far * 80 against the party (5). Or, if a person says, "that he did owe a debt, but that he had paid it," such an admission will not be received as evidence to prove the debt, without being also evidence of the payment (6). What he has said in his own favour may perhaps weigh very little with *the jury, while his admission against himself may be conclusive; however, it is reasonable, that if any part of his statement is admitted in evidence, the whole should be admitted (1). An admission by the defendant, that he owes a certain sum of money to the plaintiff, is strong evidence against. him in an action to recover the debt, but it will not be conclusive; the defendant, if he can, may prove the fact of payment, or show a receipt, or give other evidence to repel the presumption arising from his acknowledgment. A bill delivered by an attorney to his client, for business done during a certain period, is strong presumptive evidence against any additional item within the same period; but the bill is not like a deed to operate as an estoppel, and the party will be at liberty to prove the fact of his having transacted other business for the defendant (2). A notice to quit at a certain time is prima facie evidence, that the tenancy commenced at that period, if the notice was served personally on the tenant, and if he made no objection to the time of quitting mentioned in the notice (3). The circumstance of his not making such an objection has been considered as prima facie evidence of an admission and acquiescence. If, on the other hand, it should be made to appear, that at the time of the service the tenant did not look at the notice so as to know its contents, such evidence would completely repel the supposition of any acquiescence on the part of the tenant; for he cannot be supposed to ad (5) See Jacob v. Lindsay, 1 East 462. Smith v. Young, 1 Campb. N. P. C. 439. Ld. Barrymore v. Taylor, 1 Esp. N. P. C. 325. Randle v. Blackburn, 5 Taunt. 245. (6) Anonym. case, cited 12 Vin. Abr. (A. b. 23.) (1) See also Green v. Dunn, 3 Camp. N. P. C. 215. Smith v. Young, 1 Campb. N. P. C. 439. (2) Loveridge v. Botham, 1 Bos. & Pul. 49. (3) Doe d. Clarges v. Forster, 13 East 405. mit a fact, of which he does not appear to have been in- *SECT. V. Of the Admissibility of the Confession of a Prisoner against himself. SINCE an admission is evidence against a party in civil suits, with much stronger reason is the voluntary confession of a prisoner evidence against him on a criminal prosecution; for it is not to be conceived, that a man would be induced to make a free confession of guilt, so contrary to the feelings and principles of human nature, if the facts confessed were not true. The general rule on this subject was very fully considered in a judgment delivered by Mr. Justice Grose, on a case reserved for the opinion of the twelve judges (1); and it seems to be now clearly established, that a free and voluntary confession by a person accused of an offence, whether made before his apprehension or after, whether on a judicial examination or after commitment, whether reduced into writing or not, in short, that any voluntary confession, made by a prisoner to any person at any time or place, is strong evidence against him; and, if satisfactorily proved, sufficient to convict without any corroborating circumstance (2). But the confession must be voluntary, not obtained by improper influence, nor drawn from the prisoner by means of a threat or promise: for, however slight the promise or threat may have been, a confession so obtained cannot be received in evidence (3), on account of the uncertainty and doubt, (1) Lambe's case, 2 Leach Cr. C. 625. Hawk. P. C. b. 2. c. 46. s.. 31. Thomas's case, 2 Leach 728. (2) Wheeling's case, cor. Ld. Kenyon, C. J. 1 Leach Cr. C. 349. u. (a). P (3) Thompson's case, 1 Leach Cr. * 81 |