ascend again towards Machecoul, and to be at Leger between the 11th and the 13th. His arrival at the latter point was to be the signal for the departure of the columns of the army of La Rochelle, destined to assail the country from the south and east.

It will be recollected that the army of La Rochelle, of which Rossignol was commander-in-chief, was composed of several divisions: that of Les Sables was commanded by Mieszkousky, that of Luçon by Beffroy, that of Niort by Chalbos, that of Saumur by Santerre, that of Angers by Duhoux. The column of Les Sables had orders to move the moment Canclaux should be at Leger, and to arrive on the 13th at St. Fulgent, on the 14th at Herbiers, and on the 16th to join Canclaux at Mortagne. The columns of Luçon and Niort were to advance, supporting one another, towards Bressuire and Argenton, and to reach those parts on the 14th; lastly, the columns of Saumur and Angers, quitting the Loire, were to arrive also on the 14th in the environs of Vihiers and Chemillé. Thus, according to this plan, the whole country was to be scoured from the 14th to the 16th, and the rebels were to be enclosed by the republican columns between Mortagne, Bressuire, Argenton. Vihiers, and Chemillé. Their destruction would then be inevitable.

We have already seen that, having been twice repulsed from Luçon with considerable loss, the Vendeans had it much at heart to take their revenge. They collected in force before the republicans had time to carry their plans into execution, and while Charette* attacked the camp of Les Naudières towards Nantes, they attacked the division of Luçon, which had advanced to Chantonay. These two attempts were made on the 5th of September. That of Charette on Les Naudières was repulsed; but the attack on Chantonay, unforeseen and well-directed, threw the republicans into the greatest disorder. The young and gallant Marceau performed prodigies to prevent a disaster; but his division, after losing its baggage and its artillery, retired in confusion to Luçon. This check was likely to derange the projected plan, because the disorganization of one of the columns would leave a chasm between the division of Les Sables and that of Niort; but the representatives made the most active efforts for reorganizing it, and couriers were despatched to Rossignol to apprize him of the event.

All the Vendeans were at this moment collected at Les Herbiers around the generalissimo d'Elbée. Discord prevailed among them as among their adversaries, for the human heart is everywhere the same, and nature does not reserve disinterestedness and the virtues for one party, leaving pride, selfishness, and the vices to the other. The Vendean chiefs had their mutual jealousies, as well as the repub

* " Charette was the only individual to whom Napoleon attached particular importance. I have read a history of La Vendée, said he to me, and if the details and portraits are correct, Charette was the only great character-the true hero of that remarkable episode in our revolution. He impressed me with the idea of a great man. He betrayed genius. I replied, that I had known Charette very well in my youth, and that his brilliant exploits astonished all who had formerly been acquainted with him. We looked on him as a commonplace sort of man, devoid of information, ill-tempered, and extremely indolent. When, however, he began to rise into celebrity his early friends recollected a circumstance which certainly indicated decision of character. When Charette was first called into service during the American war, he sailed out of Brest on board a cutter during the winter. The cutter lost her mast, and to a vessel of that description, such an accident was equivalent to certain destruction. The weather was stormy-death seemed inevitable-and the sailors, throwing themselves on their knees, lost all presence of mind, and refused to exert themselves. At this crisis, Charette, notwithstanding his extreme youth, killed one of the men, in order to compel the rest to do their duty. This dreadful example had the desired effect, and the ship was saved. Ay, said the emperor, here was the spark that distinguished the hero of La Vendée. Men's dispositions are often misunderstood. There are sleepers whose waking is terrible. Charette was one of these."-Las Cases. E.

† "The Blues again occupied Chantonay. We were much distressed at seeing them thus established in the Bocage. A new plan was concerted with M. de Royrand. He made a false attack towards the four roads, while the grand army, making a great circuit, assailed the republican rearguard towards the bridge of Charron. The victory was due to Bonchamp's division, which, with great intrepidity, carried the intrenchments. Thus surrounded, the defeat of the Blues was terrible. The great roads were intercepted, and their columns bewildered in the Bocage. They lost both their cannon and baggage, and seldom had suffered so great a loss of men. A battalion that had assumed the name of the Avenger,' and had never given quarter to any Vendean, was wholly exterminated."-Memoirs of the Marchioness de Larochejaquelein. E.

lican chiefs. The generals paid but little deference to the superior council, which affected a sort of sovereignty. Possessing the real strength, they were by no means disposed to yield the command to a power which owed to themselves its factitious existence. They were, moreover, envious of d'Elbée, the generalissimo, and alleged that Bonchamps was much better qualified for the supreme command. Charette, for his part, wished to remain sole master of Lower Vendée. There was, consequently, but little disposition among them to unite and to concert a plan in opposition to that of the republicans. An intercepted despatch had made them acquainted with the intentions of their enemies. Bonchamps was the only one who proposed a bold project, and which indicated comprehensive views. He was of opinion that it would not be possible to resist much longer the forces of the republic collected in La Vendée; that it behoved them to quit their woods and ravines, in which they would be everlastingly buried, without knowing their allies, or being known by them; he insisted consequently that, instead of exposing themselves to the risk of being destroyed, it would be better to march in close column from La Vendée, and to advance into Bretagne, where they were desired, and where the republic did not expect to be struck. He proposed that they should proceed to the coast, and secure a seaport, communicate with the English, receive an emigrant prince there, then start for Paris, and thus carry on an offensive and decisive war. This advice, which is attributed to Bonchamps, was not followed by the Vendeans, whose views were still so narrow, and whose repugnance to leave their own country was still so strong. Their chiefs thought only of dividing that country into four parts, that they might reign over them individually. Charette was to have Lower Vendée, M. de Bonchamps the banks of the Loire towards Angers, M. de LarocheJacquelein the remainder of Upper Anjou, M. de Lescure the whole insurgent portion of Poitou. M. d'Elbée was to retain his useless title of generalissimo, and the superior council its factitious authority.

On the 9th, Canclaux put himself in motion, leaving a strong reserve under the command of Grouchy and Haxot for the protection of Nantes, and despatched the Mayence column towards Leger. Meanwhile, the former army of Brest, under Beysser, making the circuit of Lower Vendée by Pornic, Bourneuf, and Machecoul, was to rejoin the Mayence column at Leger.

These movements, directed by Canclaux, were executed without impediment. The Mayence column, its advanced guard commanded by Kleber, and the main body by Aubert-Dubayet, drove all its enemies before it. Kleber, with the advanced guard, equally humane and heroic, encamped his troops out of the villages to prevent devastations. "In passing the beautiful lake of Grand-Lieu," said he, "we had delightful landscapes and scenery equally pleasing and diversified. In an immense pasture strolled at random numerous herds left entirely to themselves. I could not help lamenting the fate of those unfortunate inhabitants, who, led astray and imbued with fanaticism by their priests, refused the benefits offered by a new order of things to run into certain destruction." Kleber made continual efforts to

* "Emanuel, Count de Grouchy, born in 1769, entered the army at the age of fourteen. On the breaking out of the Revolution, he showed his attachment to liberal principles, and served in the campaign of 1792 as commander of a regiment of dragoons. He was afterwards sent into La Vendée, where he distinguished himself on several occasions. In 1797 he was appointed second in command of the army destined for the invasion of Ireland, but was compelled to return to France without effecting anything. In 1799 he contributed to Moreau's victories in Germany, and the battle of Hohenlinden was gained chiefly by his skill and courage. During the campaign in Russia, Grouchy commanded one of the three cavalry corps of the grand army; and was rewarded with the marshal's baton for his brilliant services in the campaign of 1814. After the restoration, he joined Napoleon on his return from Elba, and was accused by him of being the author of the defeat at Waterloo, by permitting two divisions of the Prussian army under Blucher to join the English forces. Grouchy was afterwards ordered to be arrested by the ordinance of 1815, in consequence of which he retired to the United States, where he remained until he received permission to return to France." - Encyclopædia Americana. E.

† "The republican general Haxo was a man of great military talent. He distinguished himself in the Vendean war, but in the year 1794, shot himself through the head, when he saw his army defeated by the insurgents, rather than encounter the vengeance of the Convention."-Scott's Life of Napoleon. E.

protect the country against the soldiers, and most frequently with success. A civil commission had been added to the staff, to carry into execution the decree of the 1st of August, which directed that the country should be laid waste, and the inhabitants removed to other places. The soldiers were forbidden ever to burn anything, and it was only by the orders of the generals and of the civil commission that the means of destruction were to be employed.

On the 14th, the Mayence column arrived at Leger, and was there joined by that of Brest under the command of Beysser. Meanwhile the column of Les Sables, under Mieszkousky, had advanced to St. Fulgent, according to the concerted plan, and already given a hand to the army of Canclaux. That of Luçon, delayed for a moment by its defeat at Chantonay, was behind its time; but thanks to the zeal of the representatives, who had given it a new general, Beffroy, it was again advancing. That of Niort had reached La Chataigneraie. Thus, though the general movement had been retarded for a day or two on all the points, and though Canclaux had not arrived till the 14th at Leger, where he ought to have been on the 12th, still the delay was common to all the columns, their unity was not destroyed, and there was nothing to prevent the prosecution of the plan of campaign. But, in this interval of time, the news of the defeat sustained by the Luçon division had reached Saumur; Rossignol, Ronsin, and the whole of the staff had taken alarm; and, apprehensive that similar accidents might befall the two other columns of Niort and Les Sables, whose force they suspected, they determined to order them to return immediately to their first posts. This order was most imprudent; yet it was not issued with the wilful design of uncovering Canclaux and exposing his wings: but those from whom it emanated had little confidence in his plan; they were well disposed, on the slightest obstacle to deem it impossible, and to give it up. It was no doubt this feeling that determined the staff of Saumur to order the retrograde movement of the columns of Niort, Luçan, and Les Sables.

Canclaux, pursuing his march, had made fresh progress; he had attacked Montaigu on three points. Kleber by the Nantes road, Aubert-Dubayel by that of Roche-Servière, and Beysser by that of St. Fulgent, had fallen upon it all at once, and had soon dislodged the enemy. On the 17th, Canclaux took Clisson, and, not perceiving that Rossignol was yet acting, he resolved to halt, and to confine himself to reconnoissances till he should receive further intelligence.

Canclaux, therefore, established himself in the environs of Clisson, left Beysser at Montaigu, and pushed forward Kleber with the advanced guard to Torfou. Such was the state of things on the 18th. The counter-orders given from Saumur had reached the Niort division, and been communicated to the two other divisions of Luçon and Les Sables; they had immediately turned back, and, by their retrograde movement, thrown the Vendeans into astonishment, and Canclaux into the greatest embarrassment. The Vendeans were about a hundred thousand men under arms. There was an immense number of them towards Vihiers and Chemillé, facing the columns of Saumur and Angers. There was a still greater number about Clisson and Montaigu, on Canclaux's hands. The columns of Angers and Saumur, seeing them so numerous, said that it was the Mayence army which threw them upon their hands, and inveighed against the plan which exposed them to the attack of so formidable an enemy. This, however, was not the case. The Vendeans were on foot in sufficient number to find employment for the republicans in every quarter. On the same day, instead of throwing themselves upon Rossignol's columns, they advanced upon Canclaux; and d'Elbée and Lescure quitted Upper Vendée with the intention of marching against the army of Mayence.

By a singular complication of circumstances, Rossignol, on learning the success of Canclaux, who had penetrated into the very heart of La Vendée, countermanded his first orders for retreat, and directed his columns to advance. The columns of Saumur and Angers, being nearest to him, acted first and skirmished, the one at Doué, the other at the Ponts-de-Cé. The advantages were equal. On the 18th, the column of Saumur, commanded by Santerre, attempted to advance from Vihiers to a small village called Coron. Owing to faulty dispositions, artillery, cavalry, and infantry, were confusedly crowded together in the streets of this village. Santerre endeavoured to repair this blunder, and ordered the troops to fall back, with the intention of drawing them up in order of battle on a height. But Ronsin, who, in the absence of Rossignol, arrogated to himself a superior authority, found fault with Santerre for ordering the retreat, and opposed it. At this moment the Vendeans rushed upon the republicans, and the whole division was thrown into the most frightful disorder. It contained many men of the new contingent raised with the tocsin; these dispersed: all were hurried away, and fled in confusion from Coron to Vihiers, Doué, and Saumur. On the following day, the 19th, the Vendeans advanced against the Angers division, commanded by Duhoux. As fortunate as the day before, they drove back the republicans beyond Erigne and once more possessed themselves of the Ponts-de-Cé.

In the quarter where Canclaux was, the fighting was not less brisk. On the same day, twenty thousand Vendeans, posted in the environs of Torfou, rushed upon Kleber's advanced guard, consisting at most of two thousand men. Kleber placed himself in the midst of his soldiers, and supported them against this host of assailants. The ground on which the action took place was a road commanded by heights; in spite of the disadvantage of the position, he retired with order and firmness. Meanwhile a piece of artillery was dismounted; some confusion then ensued in his battalions, and those brave fellows were giving way for the first time. At this sight, Kleber, in order to stop the enemy, placed an officer with a few soldiers at a bridge, saying, "My lads, defend this passage to your last gasp." This order they executed with admirable heroism. In the meantime the main body came up and renewed the combat. The Vendeans were at length repulsed, driven to a great distance, and punished for their transient advantage.†

All these events had occurred on the 19th. The order to advance, which had so ill succeeded with the two divisions of Saumur and Angers, had not reached the

* " M. de Piron opposed Santerre at the head of twelve thousand men; the Blues marched from Coron upon Vihiers, and their army, forty thousand strong, the most part from levies en masse, occupied a line of four leagues along the great road. M. de Piron, observing the error of this disposition, attacked with vigour the centre of the republicans, and, after an hour and a half's fighting, succeeded in cutting their line and throwing them into disorder. Their artillery filing off at that moment through a long and narrow street of Coron, M. de Piron instantly secured it, by placing troops at each end of the village, and the rout became complete. The enemy were followed for four miles, and lost eighteen cannon and their wagons. It was somewhere about this period that the republicans found the dead body of a woman, about whom a great deal was said in the newspapers. A short time previously to the engagement at Coron, a soldier accosted me at Boulaye, saying he had a secret to confide to me. It was a woman, who said her name was Jeanne Robin, and that she was from Courlay. The vicar of that parish to whom I wrote, answered, that she was a very good girl, but that he had been unable to dissuade her from being a soldier. The evening before one of our battles, she sought for M. de Lescure, and addressing him, said, General, I am a woman. To-morrow there is to be a battle, let me but have a pair of shoes; I am sure I shall fight so that you will not send me away. She indeed fought under Lescure's eye, and called to him, General, you must not pass me; I shall always be nearer the Blues than you!" She was wounded in the hand, but this only animated her the more, and, rushing furiously into the thick of the conflict, she perished. There were in other divisions a few women who also fought disguised as men. I saw two sisters, fourteen and fifteen years old, who were very courageous. In the army of M. de Bonchamp, a young woman became a dragoon to avenge the death of her father, and during the war performed prodigies of valour." - Memoirs of the Marchioness de Larochejaquelein. E.

t

"At the head of three thousand men, M. de Lescure succeeded in maintaining the battle of Torfou for two hours. This part of the country, the most unequal and woody of the Bocage, did not allow the Mayençais to observe how weak a force was opposed to them before Bonchamp's division arrived, and Charette and the other chiefs had succeeded in rallying those who had fled on the first onset. They then spread themselves round the left of the republicans, whose columns, entangled in deep and intricate roads, were exposed to the fire of the Vendeans. The courage of the republican officers would scarcely have saved them, had not Kleber, after a retreat of about a league, placed two pieces of cannon on the bridge of Boussay, and said to a colonel, You and your battalion must die here.' - Yes, general,' replied the brave man, and perished on the spot. This allowed Kleber time to rally the Mayençais, so as to stop the career of the Vendeans, who proceeded no further. The next day Charette and Lescure attacked General Beysser at Montaigu to prevent his junction with the Mayençais, and completely defeated him. The panic of the republicans was such that they could not be rallied nearer than Nantes." Ibid. E.

columns of Luçon and Niort, on account of the distance. Beysser was still at Montaigu, forming the right of Canclaux, and finding himself uncovered. Canclaux, with a view to place Beysser under cover, ordered him to leave Montaigu and draw nearer to the main body. He directed Kleber to advance towards Beysser, in order to protect his movement. Beysser, too negligent, had left his column ill-guarded at Montaigu. Messrs. de Lescure and Charette had proceeded thither; they surprised and would have annihilated it but for the intrepidity of two battalions, which by their firmness checked the rapidity of the pursuit and of the retreat. The artillery and the baggage were lost, and the wrecks of this column fled to Nantes, where they were received by the brave reserve left to protect the place. Canclaux then resolved to fall back, that he might not be left alone en flèche in the country, exposed to all the attacks of the Vendeans. Accordingly, he retreated upon Nantes with his brave Mayençais, who had not suffered, owing to their imposing attitude, and to the refusal of Charette to join Messrs. d'Elbée and Bonchamps in the pursuit of the republicans.

The cause which had prevented the success of this new expedition against La Vendée is evident. The staff of Saumur had been dissatisfied with a plan which allotted the Mayence column to Canclaux. The check of the 5th of September furnished it with a sufficient pretext for being disheartened and relinquishing that plan. A counter-order was immediately issued to the columns of Les Sables, Luçon, and La Rochelle. Canclaux, who had successfully advanced, found himself thus uncovered, and the check at Torfou rendered his position still more difficult. Meanwhile, the army of Saumur, on receiving intelligence of his progress, marched from Saumur and Angers to Vihiers and Chemillé, and, had it not so suddenly dispersed, it is probable that the retreat of the wings would not have prevented the success of the enterprise. Thus, too great promptness in relinquishing the proposed plan, the defective organization of the new levies, and the great force of the Vendeans, who amounted to more than one hundred thousand under arms, were the causes of these new reverses. But there was neither treason on the part of the staff of Saumur, nor folly in the plan of Canclaux. The effect of these reverses was disastrous, for the new resistance of La Vendée awakened all the hopes of the counter-revolutionists, and exceedingly aggravated the perils of the republic. Lastly, if the armies of Brest and Mayence had not been shaken by them, that of La Rochelle was once more disorganized, and all the contingents proceeding from the levy en masse had returned to their homes, carrying the deepest discouragement along with them.

The two parties in the army lost no time in accusing one another. Philippeaux, always the most ardent, sent to the committee of public welfare a letter full of indignation, in which he attributed to treason the counter-order given to the columns of the army of La Rochelle. Choudieu and Richard, commissioners at Saumur, wrote answers equally vehement, and Ronsin went to the minister and to the committee of public welfare, to denounce the faults of the plan of campaign. Canclaux, he said, by causing too strong masses to act by Lower Vendée, had driven the whole insurgent population into Upper Vendée, and occasioned the defeat of the columns of Saumur and Angers. Lastly, Ronsin, returning calumnies with calumnies, replied to the charge of treason by that of aristocracy, and denounced at once the two armies of Brest and Mayence as full of suspicious and evil-disposed men. Thus the quarrel of the Jacobin party with that which was in favour of discipline and regular warfare became more and more acrimonious.