Emerson v. Clayton was cited and approved, and any expreșsions in Noble v. McFarland and other cases, which conflict with the opinion, were modified by the construction it gave to the act.

It is, therefore, clear that a woman who marries after the passage of the act in question is not within the saving clause of the Statute of Limitations, as against a party in the adverse possession of lands whereof she was seised at the time of her marriage, or which she subsequently acquires in the mode and manner mentioned in the act. As to the lands of which a woman, married at the date of the act, was previously seised, the limitation begins to run against her after the lapse of time barred the husband's right to recover them. The court uses this language: "When, therefore, the life-estate, which the husband had acquired by virtue of the marriage, was terminated by operation of the Statute of Limitations, and the act of 1861 removed the disability of coverture of the complainants, they were then bound to bring their action within seven years, or their right or title would be barred. This the complainants failed to do, but permitted the defendant to remain upon the land undisturbed for more than seven years after the passage of the act of 1861. By non-action on their part they have lost their rights. They are not protected by the saving clause of the statute."

Castner et al. v. Walrod, in which these views are announced, was decided by the Supreme Court of Illinois, Jan. 30, 1875. It was, on a petition for rehearing, reaffirmed in an elaborate opinion, filed Jan. 31, 1877.

Applying them to this case, it follows that the life-estate of Abram D. Harrel was, in December, 1864, extinguished by the operation of the statute. His wife's right of entry was then absolutely vested, and, notwithstanding her coverture, was completely barred in 1871. The plaintiff claiming under her is, therefore, not entitled to maintain this suit.

It may be proper to add, that the defendants put in evidence a paper writing, purporting to be a certified copy of a mortgage of the land in controversy by said William O'Hara and his wife, bearing date September, 1820, to John P. Cabanne; and the record of certain proceedings of the Circuit Court of Pike County, within the then limits of which the land was situate, showing that the mortgagee filed his bill of foreclosure April 23, 1822, the first day of the term, against Susan O'Hara, the widow, and others, children and heirs of William M. O'Hara; an order. of publication against defendants as non-residents; a decree of foreclosure; the appointment of a commissioner to make sale of the mortgaged premises; his report; the order confirming his doings in the premises; his acknowledgment of the deed to said John P. Cabanne, the purchaser, dated Feb. 20, 1823; and the approval by the court of said deed. The defendants proved that Cabanne died in 1842, leaving children and grandchildren, a part of whom conveyed by deed, dated April 1, 1861, five undivided sevenths of the demanded premises to one Nettleton, who conveyed by way of quitclaim to the defendants.

Various questions arising upon this evidence, - the jurisdiction of the Pike Circuit Court, the validity of its decree, and the charge of the court below upon these and other matters involved, - have been argued at great length, and with marked ability. We do not consider it necessary to express any opinion upon them. Error in regard to them, if any there be, would be of no avail to the plaintiff. The unreported case we have last cited establishes a rule of property in Illinois, which binds the courts of the United States, and presents an insuperable bar to his recovery. Judgment affirmed.

INDEX.

ABANDONMENT. See Letters-patent, 14.

ADMIRALTY. See Practice, 23.

1. Owners of a ship are not liable, under existing laws, for any loss,
damage, or injury by a collision, occasioned without their privity or
knowledge, beyond the amount of their interest in such ship and her
cargo at the time the collision occurred. The "Atlas," 302.

2. The true measure of compensation to an innocent party, in a case of
collision, is damages to the full amount of loss actually suffered by
him.

Id.

3. The shipper or consignee of the cargo of a vessel, being innocent of
all wrong, bears no proportion of the loss resulting from a collision.
He may pursue his remedy at common law; or in admiralty, by a
proceeding in rem, or by libel in personam against the owner of either
or both of the offending vessels. Id.

4. A collision between two vessels, which were at fault, resulted in the
loss of the cargo of a third vessel which was not at fault. Its owner
proceeded in rem against one of the offending vessels, - Held, that
he was entitled to a decree against it for the entire amount of his
damages. Id.

5. The doctrine announced in The "Atlas," supra, p. 302, that where an
innocent party suffers damages by a collision resulting from the
mutual fault of two vessels, only one of which is libelled, the decree
should be against such vessel for the whole amount of the damages,
and not for a moiety thereof, reaffirmed, and applied to this case.
The "Juniata," 337.

6. The rule requiring a sailing-vessel to keep her course when approach-
ing a steamer in such direction as to involve risk of collision, does
not forbid such necessary variations in her course as will enable her
to avoid immediate danger arising from natural obstructions to navi-
gation. The "John L. Hasbrouck," 405.

7. Where well-known usage has sanctioned one course for a steamer as-
cending, and another for a sailing-vessel descending, a river, the
vessel, if required by natural obstructions to navigation to change
her course, is, after passing them, bound to resume it. Failing to do

ADMIRALTY (continued).

so, and continuing her course directly into that which an approach-
ing steamer is properly navigating, she is not entitled to recover for
a loss occasioned by a collision, which the steamer endeavored to
prevent, by adopting the only means in her power. Id.

ADVANCEMENT OF CAUSES. See Practice, 1, 30.
AFFREIGHTMENT. See Contracts, 1.

AGENT. See Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes, 4; Common Car-

riers, 2-5.

1. The government is not bound by the act or declaration of its agent,
unless it manifestly appears that he acted within the scope of his
authority, or was employed in his capacity as a public agent to do
the act or make the declaration for it. Whiteside et al. v. United
States, 247.

2. Individuals, as well as courts, must take notice of the extent of au-
thority conferred by law upon a person acting in an official capacity.

Id.

AMENDMENTS.

Where no local statute or rule of local law is involved, the power to
amend is the same in attachment suits as in others. Tilton et al. v.
Cofield et al., 163.

APPEAL. See Supersedeas, 1.

APPROPRIATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF HARBORS ON

NAVIGABLE RIVERS. See Commerce, 5.
ARKANSAS, PRACTICE CODE OF. See Practice, 17.

ASSIGNEE IN BANKRUPTCY. See Contracts, 5.

1. Under the Bankrupt Act of March 2, 1867 (14 Stat. 517), the assignee
might sue in the State courts to recover the assets of the bankrupt,
no exclusive jurisdiction having been given to the courts of the
United States. Quære, Whether such exclusive jurisdiction is given
by the Revised Statutes. Claflin v. Houseman, Assignee, 130.

2. A suit pending against a party at the time he is adjudged a bankrupt,
may, after due notice to his assignee, be prosecuted to final judg-
ment against the latter in his representative capacity, where he
makes no objection to the jurisdiction and the bankrupt court does
not arrest the proceedings. Norton, Assignee, v. Switzer, 355.

3. Such judgment may be filed with the assignee as an ascertainment of
the amount due to the creditor by the bankrupt, and as a basis of
dividends, but it is effectual and operative for that purpose only. Id.

ASSISTANT SPECIAL AGENT OF THE TREASURY. See Con-
tracts, 3.

ASSUMPSIT. See Pleading, 3.

ATTACHMENT SUITS, POWER TO AMEND IN.

Where no local statute or rule of local law is involved, the power to amend
is the same in attachment suits as in others. Tilton et el. v. Cofield
et al., 163.

BAILMENT. See Mixture of Goods.

1. Actual delivery by the bailee on the demand of the true owner, who
has the right to the immediate possession of the goods bailed, is a
sufficient defence of the bailee against the claim of the bailor, and
there is no difference in this regard between a common carrier and
other bailees. The "Idaho," 575.

2. While a contract of bailment undoubtedly raises a strong presump-
tion that the bailor is entitled to the thing bailed, it is not true that
the bailee thereby conclusively admits the right of the principal.
His contract is to do with the property committed to him what his
principal has directed, to restore it, or to account for it. He does
so account for it when he has yielded it to the claim of one who has
a right paramount to that of his bailor. Id.

3. If there be any estoppel on the part of the bailee, it ceases when the
bailment on which it is founded is determined by what is equivalent
to an eviction by title paramount; that is, by the reclamation of
possession by the true owner.

Id.

4. Nor can it be maintained that a carrier can excuse himself for failure
to deliver to the order of the shipper, only when the goods have been
taken from his possession by legal proceedings, or where the shipper
has obtained the goods by fraud from the true owner. Id.

5. Whether the shipper has obtained, by fraud practised upon the true
owner, the possession he gives to the carrier, or whether he mistak-
enly supposes he has rights to the property, his relation to his bailee
remains the same. He cannot confer rights which he does not
possess; and, if he cannot withhold the possession from the true
owner, one claiming under him cannot. Id.

6. While a bailee cannos avail himself of the title of a third person
(though that person be the true owner), for the purpose of keeping
the property for himself, nor in any case where he has not yielded
to the paramount title, he is not answerable if he has delivered the
property to its true owner at his demand.. Id.

7. Without asserting that a title to personal property may not be created
between the issue of a bill of lading therefor and its delivery to the
ship, which will prevail over the master's bill, the court holds, that,
in the absence of any such intervening right, a bill of lading does
cover goods subsequently delivered and received to fill it, and that it
will represent the ownership of the goods. Their subsequent removal
from the vessel by a person other than the true owner, either with
or without the consent of her officers, cannot divest that owner-
ship. Id.

8. The taking possession of property by one not its owner, or authorized