cerning his own conduct, the by-standers, being comparatively uninfluenced by passion or selfishness, will probably see the question in its just light. Or putting aside all notion of a moral sense, whose existence is yet a matter of dispute, it is evident that the majority of the members of a society must always feel it to be against their interest that the strong and crafty should do what they please with the persons or acquisitions of the weaker and incautious. Scarcely any individual can feel secure or happy for a moment, so long as he holds his life, and whatever he may possess, only on the frail chance of no one stronger or more cunning than himself being desirous to terminate his existence or appropriate his possessions. The great body of every society must, therefore, see almost instinctively (for the boundaries of instinct and reason are not easily definable) the necessity of discountenancing the commission of such wrongs, and of giving their approval to some rule of right as a substitute for mere strength or cunning in the determination of questions where the wills of two or more individuals clash.*

* If self-love, if benevolence be natural to man, if reason and forethought be also natural, then may the epithet be applied to justice, order, fidelity, property, society. Men's inclinations, their necessities, lead them to combine; their understanding and experience tell them that this combination is impossible where each governs himself by no rule, and pays no regard to the possessions of others; and from these passions and affections conjoined, as soon as we perceive like passions and affections in others, the sentiment of justice, throughout all ages, has infallibly and certainly had place, to some degree or other, in every individual of the human species. In so sagacious an animal,

LEGAL AND MORAL RULES.

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But, moreover, it must soon be perceived that the mere force of public opinion, however strongly it operates upon one of the leading instincts of man's disposition, the appetency for the approbation and sympathy of his fellows, is not, in extreme cases, sufficiently powerful to prevent the commission of wrongs, and ensure the observance of the acknowledged rule of moral right. The society will, therefore, be led in its collective capacity, in addition to the sanction of its approbation and the threat of its disapproval, to enforce the observance of the rule they have laid down, by the weight of their combined power, and the exaction of penalties from offenders.

The rules according to which a society confers its approbation or disapprobation on particular actions constitute their notions of moral right and wrong; and these, being spread by precept, and confirmed by mutual communication, compose what is called public opinion. The rules laid down for the determination of cases in which the society interferes compulsorily, or by penalty, constitute the law, or established code of legal right and wrong.

The interference of the latter is necessarily confined to cases of a definite and determinate character, and cannot be extended to a vast variety of complicated and delicate relations in which individuals are often placed towards each other, and in which their conduct must be left more or

what necessarily arises from the exertion of his intellectual faculties may justly be esteemed natural.'-Hume; Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals. Appendix 3.

less to their discretion, influenced only by the power of public opinion over them, their own sense of moral propriety, and the habit which almost all individuals will naturally have acquired of thinking and acting in conformity with the recognized code of moral fitness.

Since, however, there can be, at one time and in one society, but one course or system of conduct most conducive to the general welfare, and, therefore, right, both the moral and legal rules ought, so far as the least comprehensive of the two extends, to coincide, and, in all cases, to harmonize with each other. They ought, at the same time, to correspond with the principles of abstract or natural justice, the only criterion of their correctness. That they do not always so agree in the greater number of societies, savage or civilized, perhaps wholly in none,—is more a matter of lamentation than of wonder to those who are acquainted with the mode in which they are practically constructed and taught, and the conflicting passions and interests which are continually at work to bias and pervert them.

Every established rule, legal or moral, is an expression of that course of conduct which society claims of each individual; who, in return for his obedience to it, acquires on his side a claim to have the observance of the same system of rules enforced where he is concerned upon every other individual by the society. His claim on society is called his right, the claim of society on him, to respect the rights of others, his duty. The rights and duties of each individual are thus cor

RIGHT AND DUTY CORRELATIVE.

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relative, or mutually dependent on each other, and prescribed by the same rules.*

Natural or moral right being whatever conduces most to the welfare of mankind, the rights of man in the aggregate are entirely identified with his interests. Those of each individual coincide with his interest only so far as it does not interfere with that of the species or community of which he forms an unit. Fortunately, or rather by the contrivance of a beneficent Creator,-the human mind is so constituted that the pursuit of virtue, the conferring happiness on others, and the acquisition of the esteem of society which is sure to follow such a course of conduct, form the most copious and inexhaustible sources of pleasure; so that the true interest of the individual is, in almost every case, identified with that of his kind. The exceptions are comparatively rare; and in their instance, we are taught by religion to

*The theory which derives rights exclusively from a social contract entered into by all parties concerned,' though more than once exploded, has been revived in the present day. Such a contract is avowedly a fiction; for when or where did the members of any existing society enter into any compact of the kind? The submission of a society cannot be taken as proof of agreement. We are obliged to submit to many things against our consent. Submission does not even imply the consent of the majority, for a small minority will often overawe and control a body vastly superior to them in number. Even were it physically possible for all the members of a society to deliberate and agree upon the institutions under which they are to live, such agreement would be no proof of the justice or rightfulness of these institutions. The passions, the prejudices, and the ignorance of the multitude, or the influence of a few crafty leaders, might induce them to agree to laws of the most injurious tendency, and so to sacrifice their just rights.

believe that a compensation is reserved in another state of existence for such as voluntarily sacrifice their own immediate interests to those of their fellow-creatures*.

*There exists a peculiar school of writers on morals, politics, and jurisprudence, whose leading tenet is that every action of man has necessarily a selfish motive, and that all which is wanting to produce perfect and universal morality, is for each individual to be taught what they declare to be unexceptionably true: viz., that his interest is uniformly identical with that of his kind, and, consequently, that he will be most certain to secure his own greatest happiness, by following the rules which lead to the greatest happiness of his kind.

It is strange that the many fallacies latent in this the doctrine of the Utilitarians' should be overlooked by rea soners, who especially pride themselves on their skill in detecting the fallacies of others. Their error is threefold at least:

1. If, in saying that man acts uniformly from selfish motives, they only mean that every action supposes a propensity on the part of the agent, and a preference of that over every other course of conduct, their proposition is identical, and amounts to this,-man's actions are always the result of his volition; which is no discovery. But if they use the term selfish in its ordinary sense, so as to imply that the only motive of which individuals are conscious, is a desire of self-gratification apart from any consideration of the feelings of others, then the proposition is obviously false. The truth is, they use the term in the first sense, when they lay down their axiom; and in the second, when they employ it in argument.

2. It is not true that each individual is certain on every occasion to secure his own greatest happiness, in this world at least, (and surely the sect in question intend no reference to the next,) by acting in conformity with the rule of moral right. Cases undoubtedly occur in which the interests of individuals are positively opposed to that of society. To take an extreme example, it is for the evident good of society that a convicted and confirmed criminal