RIGHT TO GOOD GOVERNMENT.

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In other words, both the legislative and executive functions of social government, to be effectual, must be entrusted to a limited number of persons.

Now, were it demonstrable beyond the possibility of dispute, that the permanent interests of a community (the only end and object of any government, and the measure of the rights of the individuals composing it) would be always best promoted by conferring the absolute power of making and executing laws on a single individual, autocracy would be the form of government most accordant with the natural rights of man. If, on the contrary, it could be plainly proved that the welfare of a community required every individual, man, woman, and child, (the only true universal suffrage)—or every adult individual of both sexes

-or every adult male-or only a certain number and class of adult males-or any other select body whatsoever to be entrusted with the legislative or executive power, or with the choice of the persons to whom that power is to be delegated

then, in any of these several cases, that form of government would be the one most accordant with natural right. In short, the right of every individual in this matter is not to self-government, but to good government-to that form of government which is most highly conducive to the general welfare-a right to have his happiness consulted, and his rights protected, by the authorities entrusted with power, in the same degree with those of every other person in the community. That this is really what has been understood, though perhaps confusedly, by even the most extravagant theorists on the principle of self-government, is

shown by their stopping far short of universal suffrage. None of them think of giving a vote to children, madmen, or criminals; few have even proposed its extension to females; yet, if the right is anything inherent in the species, it must belong equally to every individual from the moment of his birth, and can only quit him with his life. If they defend their limitation of the suffrage, as without doubt they would, by asserting the incapacity of women, children, lunatics, &c. and that the interests of all, including these classes, would be better secured by the suffrage being exclusively entrusted to the adult males, the question is then confessedly but one of degree-between one kind of limitation and another-and to be argued upon the same principle, and with reference to no other abstract right than that we speak of; namely, to good, or rather, to the best government. And if we assume, what few in this country will think of disputing, that representative institutions, in some shape or other, are indispensable to good government, the question will be simply what limitation or extension of the electoral franchise, and what checks upon its exercise, may be reasonably expected to provide the best form of government, and secure the greatest sum of general happiness.

It is not, of course, our object here to enter upon this question. All we wish to do is, to place the subject of political rights in a clear light, and on its proper footing; and to show the grounds on which all parties are bound in reason to argue it. The solution of the problem in any individual instance will necessarily vary much, according to

POLITICAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES.

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local and temporary circumstances. The extent of suffrage which would be most for the benefit of a highly intelligent and generally educated community must be prejudicial to a people in which the vast majority are yet wrapped in almost brutal ignorance. The same form of government which is suited to England in the present day would clearly not be equally advisable for Spain-perhaps even not for Ireland.

What has been said may also help to remove the prevailing fallacy of supposing the elective franchise, under a representative form of government, to be of the nature of a right personal to the voter. When individuals are selected to exercise any power in a state, the legitimate object of such selection being solely the promotion of the general happiness, not the exhibition of any peculiar favour or advantage to the individuals themselves, it follows that this power, whatever its nature, whether regal, senatorial, or electoral, can only be looked upon in the light of a sacred duty imposed upon the individual, to be exercised strictly and conscientiously for the benefit of the people at large, and not for any purpose of private or local interest. It follows as a necessary corollary, that no one can have a property, or a private interest, vested in any public trust or office; or any just ground of complaint if it is taken away from him at any time for purposes of public benefit.

The political rights of man may, therefore, be defined as the claim of every individual to have his interest promoted and protected to the same extent as that of every other member of society by

the combined power of the whole body: in other words, it is a right to good government. Reciprocally, his duty to society is, to submit to, and cooperate when required in the just exercise of its power. The right is conditional on the fulfilment of the duty the duty on the enjoyment of the right. The denial of the right absolves from the dutythe refusal of the duty nullifies the right. Tyranny justifies resistance from the individuals subjected to it. Crime justifies the infliction by society of punishment on the individuals guilty of it.

Government has been called a necessary evil. Expensive, unjust, and tyrannical governments are evils unquestionably of the most severe kind, since they entail a train of unnecessary sufferings on those who are subjected to them; but a good government is simply the establishment and maintenance of a rule of order and justice for securing the general welfare; which can hardly be called an evil: at least if any evils accompany it, they are compensated by an infinitely preponderating balance of good.

The right, therefore, to good government, which we have placed last in the order of man's natural rights, comprehends, in truth, all the rest. It is only through the means of good government, that individuals can enjoy their rights to personal freedom, to the common bounty of Heaven, or to the property which their toil has produced them; and it is solely in order to secure to individuals the enjoyment of these their natural rights, that government is instituted.

I have declined, as foreign to the purpose of this work, to enter into the question of the best

form of government, either abstractedly, or with reference to any particular age and country. Such an inquiry, indeed, it is at once apparent, cannot properly be instituted until a complete knowledge has been obtained of the duties of a government, and the means by which it can best fulfil them. Without a clear understanding of the nature of these duties, any question as to the form of government most likely to secure their effective fulfilment would be palpably premature.